Coalitional multinomial probabilistic values by Carreras Escobar, Francisco & Puente del Campo, María Albina
COALITIONAL MULTINOMIAL PROBABILISTIC VALUES
Francesc Carrerasy and Mara Albina Puentez
February 6, 2015
Abstract
We introduce a new family of coalitional values designed to take into account players'
attitudes with regard to cooperation. This new family of values applies to cooperative
games with a coalition structure by combining the Shapley value and the multinomial
probabilistic values, thus generalizing the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues.
Besides an axiomatic characterization, a computational procedure is provided in terms
of the multilinear extension of the game and an application to the Catalonia Parlia-
ment, Legislature 2003{2007, is shown.
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1 Introduction
Value theory started in 1953 with Shapley [28], who introduced the axiomatic method in
cooperative game theory to dene a solution concept called now the Shapley value. The
Shapley value is characterized as the unique value to satisfy eciency, the null player prop-
erty, symmetry, and additivity.
In 1988, Weber [30] obtained a wide generalization of the Shapley value by dening the
family of probabilistic values, each one of which requires weighting coecients piS for each
player i and each coalition S  Nnfig. The payo that a probabilistic value allocates to
each player is a weighted sum of his marginal contributions in the game. We quote from
Weber [30]:
\Let player i view his participation in a game v as consisting merely of joining
some coalition S and then receiving as a reward his marginal contribution to
the coalition. If piS is the probability that he joins coalition S, then i[v] is his
expected payo from the game."
In 2000, Puente [27] (see also [19]) dened two special subfamilies of probabilistic values:
(a) binomial semivalues, where the weighting coecients depend on a unique parameter
q 2 [0; 1]; and (b) multinomial probabilistic values, where the weighting coecients depend
on n parameters, one per player and all in [0; 1] too.1 Of course, (a) is a subfamily of (b).
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1Incidentally, we point out that the \Banzhaf {indices", introduced by Carreras [7] when generalizing
the decisiveness notion studied in Carreras [8], are multinomial probabilistic values applied to simple games|
i.e., used as power indices. Cf. Carreras and Puente [12] or [13] for a joint work on these values and [20] for
their application to the study of the partnership formation, which generalizes [16] widely.
Introduced in 1974 by Aumann and Dreze [4], the notion of game with a coalition struc-
ture provided a new avenue for the development of value theory. Since then, a lot of work
has been done in this new eld, mainly addressed to dene coalitional values that often
represent extensions of classical values to this setup. The best known coalitional value is
the Owen value, an extension of the Shapley value introduced in 1977 by Owen [23] (also in
[25]). The Owen value is characterized uniquely by the following axioms: eciency, the null
player property, symmetry within unions, symmetry in the quotient game, and additivity.
In 2006, Carreras and Puente [10] (see also [11]) extended the binomial semivalues to
games with a coalition structure: they used these values in the quotient game and the
Shapley value within unions and obtained the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues, a
family depending on one parameter q 2 [0; 1] that includes (when q = 1=2) the symmetric
coalitional Banzhaf value introduced in 2002 by Alonso and Fiestras [1]. The only axiomatic
dierence between these new coalitional values and the Owen value is that the former satisfy
the total power property whereas the latter satises eciency.
In the present paper we extend the multinomial probabilistic values to games with a
coalition structure by introducing the coalitional multinomial probabilistic values, a family
that includes all symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues.
A rst main aspect of the coalitional multinomial probabilistic values is that each one of
them depends on n parameters (n being the number of players), which are interpreted as the
individual tendencies of the players to form coalitions. A second main aspect is that they
apply a multinomial probabilistic value in the quotient game that arises once the coalition
structure is actually formed, but share within each union the payo so obtained by applying
the Shapley value to a game that concerns only the players of that union.
Using the Shapley value looks highly interesting in voting contexts. Indeed, once an al-
liance is formed|and, especially, if it supports a coalition government|, cabinet ministries,
parliamentary and institutional positions, budget management, and other political respon-
sibilities should be distributed among the members of the alliance eciently, so the Shapley
value is useful here. We thus evaluate not only the parliamentary power of the alliance but
also the way to share this power allocation among its members. This two{step procedure
(rst power, then cake) oers a balanced approach for dealing with coalitional bargaining.
We emphasize the role of these new values as a consistent alternative to classical coali-
tional values. The fact that they are based on tendency proles provides new tools to
encompass a wide variety of situations that derive from players' personalities when playing
a game. In this sense, the coalitional multinomial probabilistic values constitute a signi-
cant generalization of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues, whose monoparametric
condition implies a limited capability to analyze such situations. Of course, these situations
cannot be analyzed, without modifying the game, by means of classical, nonparametric
values, which can be concerned only with the (formal) structure of the game.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the greater ability of the new values to deal with
strategic features is achieved without losing standard properties satised by classical coali-
tional values, like e.g. linearity, positivity, the total power property, the dummy player
property, symmetry within unions, or the quotient game property.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a minimum of preliminaries
is provided. Section 3 is devoted to dene and to study the family of coalitional multino-
mial probabilistic values, including an axiomatic characterization. In Section 4 we restrict
such values to simple games. Section 5 presents a computation procedure for these values
by means of multilinear extensions. Section 6 contains an application of the coalitional
multinomial probabilistic values to the analysis of the Catalonia Parliament (Legislature
2003{2007). Section 7 includes concluding remarks. All proofs are collected in Appendix 1.
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2 Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is generally familiar with the basic ideas of the cooperative game
theory (including simple games, which will be briey revised in Section 4).
2.1 Games and values
Let N be a nite set of players, usually denoted as N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, and 2N be the
set of coalitions (subsets of N). A (cooperative) game in N is a function v : 2N ! R that
assigns a real number v(S) to each coalition S  N , with v(;) = 0. A game v is monotonic if
v(S)  v(T ) whenever S  T  N . Player i 2 N is a dummy in v if v(S[fig) = v(S)+v(fig)
for all S  Nnfig, and null in v if, moreover, v(fig) = 0. Two players i; j 2 N are symmetric
in v if v(S [ fig) = v(S [ fjg) for all S  Nnfi; jg.
Endowed with the natural operations for real{valued functions, i.e. v + v0 and v for all
 2 R, the set GN of all games in N becomes a vector space. For every nonempty coalition
T  N , the unanimity game uT in N is dened by uT (S) = 1 if T  S and uT (S) = 0
otherwise, and it is easily checked that the set of all unanimity games is a basis for GN .
By a value on GN we will mean a map f : GN ! RN , that assigns to every game v a
vector f [v] with components fi[v] for all i 2 N .
The multilinear extension [21] of a game v 2 GN is the real{valued function dened on
RN by
f(x1; x2; : : : ; xn) =
X
SN
hY
i2S
xi
Y
j2NnS
(1  xj)
i
v(S): 2 (1)
2.2 Multinomial probabilistic values
The multinomial probabilistic values form a subfamily of probabilistic values [30]. They were
introduced in reliability by Puente [27] (see also [19]) as follows. Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng and
let p 2 [0; 1]n, that is, p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn) with 0  pi  1 for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, be given.
Then the coecients
piS =
Y
j2S
pj
Y
k2NnS
k 6=i
(1  pk) for all i 2 N and S  Nnfig (2)
(where the empty product, arising if S = ; or S = Nnfig, is taken to be 1) dene a
probabilistic value on GN that is called the p{multinomial probabilistic value and will be
denoted here as p. Its action is then given by
pi [v] =
X
SNnfig
hY
j2S
pj
Y
k2NnS
k 6=i
(1  pk)
i
[v(S [ fig)  v(S)] for all i 2 N and v 2 GN : (3)
In particular, the action of p on a unanimity game uT is given by
pi [uT ] =
Y
j2T
j 6=i
pj if i 2 T and pi [uT ] = 0 otherwise. (4)
As was announced in Section 1, we will attach to each pi the meaning of tendency of
player i to form coalitions, and thus we will say that p is a (tendency) prole in N . The
components of p will be assumed to be independent of each other. From Eq. (2) it follows
that coecient piS , the probability of i to join S according to [30], is an increasing function
of the tendency of each member of S to form coalitions and a decreasing function of the
tendency in this sense of each outside player, i.e. each member of Nn(S [ fig).
2The term \multilinear" means that, for each i 2 N , the function is linear in xi, that is, of the form
f(x1; x2; : : : ; xn) = gi(x1; x2; : : : ; x^i; : : : ; xn)xi + hi(x1; x2; : : : ; x^i; : : : ; xn).
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2.3 Games with a coalition structure
Given N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, we will denote by B(N) the set of all partitions of N . Each
B 2 B(N) is called a coalition structure in N , and each member of B is called a union.
The so{called trivial coalition structures are Bn = ff1g; f2g; : : : ; fngg (individual coalitions)
and BN = fNg (grand coalition). A (cooperative) game with a coalition structure is a pair
[v;B], where v 2 GN and B 2 B(N) for a given N . Each partition B gives a pattern of
cooperation among players. We denote by GcsN = GN  B(N) the set of all games with a
coalition structure and player set N .
If [v;B] 2 GcsN and B = fB1; B2; : : : ; Bmg, the quotient game vB is the game played
by the unions or, rather, by the quotient set M = f1; 2; : : : ;mg of their representatives, as
follows:
vB(R) = v
 [
r2R
Br
!
for all R M:
By a coalitional value on GcsN we will mean a map g : GcsN ! RN , which assigns to every
pair [v;B] a vector g[v;B] with components gi[v;B] for each i 2 N .
If f is a value on GN and g is a coalitional value on GcsN , it is said that g is a coalitional
value of f (or a coalitional f{value, for short) i g[v;Bn] = f [v] for all v 2 GN .
3 Coalitional multinomial probabilistic values
We introduce here a new family of coalitional values, establish their main common properties
and discuss some aspects.
3.1 Concept
When trying to extend multinomial probabilistic values to games with a coalition structure,
a rst question refers to the way by which, given a coalition structure B = fB1; B2; : : : ; Bmg
and a tendency prole p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn) in N , a tendency prole p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pm) is
dened in the quotient set M . Only two natural constraints will be imposed.
Denition 3.1 Given prole p and coalition structure B in N , prole p is a prole induced
by p in M i: (i) each pr depends only on those pi such that i 2 Br; and (ii) if, for a given
Br 2 B, there is some q 2 [0; 1] such that pi = q for all i 2 Br then pr = q.3
Of course, the interpretation attached to p1; p2; : : : ; pn in Subsection 2.2 will be kept in
passing to p1; p2; : : : ; pm. Among the innitely many possibilities to dene an induced prole
p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pm) in terms of p, let us suggest a few ones only as a matter of example:
() pr = min
i2Br
fpig
() pr = pi for some i 2 Br arbitrarily chosen
() pr =
1
br
X
i2Br
pi, where br = jBrj
() pr = max
i2Br
fpig
3Condition (ii) guarantees consistency with symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues (cf. [10, 3, 11]).
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We will not try to discuss here which is the best option (if it exists). It may happen
that dierent situations require dierent ways to dene p1; p2; : : : ; pm. Even more, nothing
prevents dierent unions to make dierent choices when dening their respective tendencies
in the quotient game|this is the reason for having imposed conditions (i) and (ii) for
each union. Fortunately, the great freedom in this choice will not aect the validity of the
theoretical results: the theory developed in this paper will be of application provided that
p is a prole induced by p, no matter by which mechanism.4
However, in order to avoid using a more cumbersome notation and any ambiguity, we
will implicitly assume from now on in the theoretical development that, for any given N , a
unique mechanism has been chosen to induce, given p and B in N , a prole p in M .
Denition 3.2 Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a nite player set and p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn) be
a prole in N . The coalitional p{multinomial probabilistic value is the coalitional value
p : GcsN ! RN dened as follows. If [v;B] 2 GcsN and i 2 Bk 2 B,
pi [v;B] =
X
RMnfkg
h Y
j2R
pj
Y
h2MnR
h6=k
(1  ph)
i X
TBknfig
v(Q [ T [ fig)  v(Q [ T )
bk
 
bk 1
t
 ; (5)
where p is the prole induced by p in M , Q =
[
r2R
Br, bk = jBkj, and t = jT j.
Remark 3.3 The coalitional p{multinomial probabilistic value p yields the result of a
two{step bargaining procedure analogous to that used in [23, 24] and also in [1, 10, 3, 11].
Here we rst apply the p{multinomial probabilistic value p in the quotient game to obtain
a payo for each union; next, we use within each union the Shapley value, denoted here by
', to share the payo eciently by applying this value to a reduced game played in that
union.5 The proof is essentially the same as in [23, 24, 1, 10, 3, 11] and will be omitted.
Moreover, the new value coincides with one of these two values when the coalition structure
is trivial. Indeed, it is straightforward to check that, for all v 2 GN and any prole p in N ,
(i) p[v;BN ] = '[v];
(ii) p[v;Bn] = p[v], i.e. p is a coalitional p{value.
Example 3.4 To illustrate the two{step procedure, we consider a very simple instance:
let n = 4 and game v be dened by v(S) = 1 if jSj  3 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Let
p = (0:4; 0:8; 0:6; 0:2) and B = ff1; 2g; f3g; f4gg. Let M = f1; 3; 4g, where 1 denotes the
representative of f1; 2g and the remaining players represent themselves (a nonstandard but
easier notation in particular cases like this). The quotient game is given by vB(R) = 1 if
R = f1; 3g; f1; 4g; f1; 3; 4g and vB(R) = 0 otherwise.
Let us choose e.g. option (), according to which each pr is the arithmetic mean of the
pi's for all i 2 Br, and take therefore as induced prole p = (0:6; 0:6; 0:2). By applying the
4Although the results obtained in practice will depend in general of this mechanism (cf. Example 3.4).
5The reduced game is as follows. First, if S  Bk, let vBS be the pseudoquotient game in M dened by
vBS (R) = v
h
(
[
r2R
Br)n(BknS)
i
for each R M:
This game is the modication of the standard quotient game vB when S replaces union Bk, as if the players
of BknS were temporarily inactive. The reduced game of v in Bk, denoted by wk, is then given by
wk(S) = 
p
k [v
B
S ] for each S  Bk:
5
p{multinomial probabilistic value p to the quotient game, using Eq. (3) we have
p[vB ] = (0:68; 0:48; 0:24):
Then, in the case of singletons f3g and f4g, the payo received by the union in the
quotient game is allocated to its unique member. For union f1; 2g, the fact that its players
are symmetric in v implies that they share the payo equally. Thus (see Fig. 1),
p[v;B] = (0:34; 0:34; 0:48; 0:24):6
v
B
B1 = {1,2} B3 = {3} B4 = {4}
0.68 0.48 0.24
1 2 3 4
0.34 0.34 0.48 0.24
λp λp λp
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
Figure 1: The two{step procedure: rst p, then '
What has happened with the symmetry of all players in the original game? Players 3
and 4 are symmetric also in the coalition structure, and hence in the quotient game, but
their nal payos dier because of their dierent parameters. Instead, players 1 and 2 earn
a common nal payo, in spite of having dierent parameters, because they are in the same
union.
3.2 Properties
The rest of this section is devoted to the discussion of common properties for all coalitional
multinomial probabilistic values. Our main aim is to reach an axiomatic characterization
for each one of these values. We begin by considering standard properties for a generic
coalitional value g on GcsN :
 linearity : g[v + v0;B] = g[v;B] + g[v0;B] for all ;  2 R, v; v0 and B
 positivity : if v is monotonic, then g[v;B]  0 for all B
 dummy player property : if i is a dummy in v, then gi[v;B] = v(fig) for all B
 symmetry within unions: if i; j 2 Bk are symmetric players in v then
gi[v;B] = gj [v;B]
 symmetry in the quotient game: if r; s 2M are symmetric players in game vB thenX
i2Br
gi[v;B] =
X
j2Bs
gj [v;B]
 quotient game property : for all [v;B] 2 GcsN and all k 2M ,X
i2Bk
gi[v;B] = gk[v
B ;Bm]: (6)
6Using other mechanisms to dene p would give dierent nal results: for example, p[v;B] =
(0:34; 0:34; 0:32; 0:16) for option (), p[v;B] = (0:34; 0:34; 0:64; 0:32) for option (), and one or another
of these results for option (), depending on which player's tendency (1 or 2) is chosen to dene p1.
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Remark 3.5 In principle, this last property makes sense only for coalitional values dened
for all N ; in such a case, one generally abuses the notation and uses a unique symbol g on
both GCSN and GCSM . However, the property also makes sense for a coalitional value g on a
given GcsN provided, at least, that it induces a coalitional value g on GcsM for each B 2 B(N).
And this is precisely the case of the coalitional multinomial probabilistic values. Indeed,
let p be a prole and B a coalition structure (both in N), M the quotient set, and p the
prole in M induced by p. Prole p denes a (multinomial probabilistic) value p on GM
and hence a coalitional (multinomial probabilistic) value p on GcsM such that, by Remark
3.3(ii),
p[w;Bm] = p[w] for all w 2 GM :
Now, two additional nonstandard properties will be considered.
Denition 3.6 Let p be a prole in N . A coalitional value g on GCSN satises the coalitional
p{multinomial total power property i, for all [v;B] 2 GcsN ,X
i2N
gi[v;B] =
X
k2M
X
RMnfkg
h Y
j2R
pj
Y
h2MnR
h 6=k
(1  ph)
i
[v(Q [Bk)  v(Q)];
where p is the prole induced by p in M and Q =
[
r2R
Br.
Denition 3.7 Let p be a prole in N . A coalitional value g on GCSN satises the property
of p{weighted payos for quotients of unanimity games i, for any B 2 B(N) and any
nonempty T  N ,
pk
X
i2Bk
gi[uT ;B] = p`
X
j2B`
gj [uT ;B] for all Bk; B` 2 B intersecting T ;
where p is the prole induced by p in M .
Our axiomatic characterization theorem essentially holds for any coalitional p{multibi-
nary probabilistic value with a positive prole p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn).
7 \Positive" merely means
that pi > 0 for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. To ease the proof of this theorem it is convenient to state a
preliminary result, which holds for any prole.
Proposition 3.8 Let p be a prole in N . The coalitional p{multinomial probabilistic value
satises positivity and the quotient game property.
Theorem 3.9 (Axiomatic characterization of each coalitional multinomial probabilistic value
with positive prole) Let p be a positive prole in a given player set N . Then there is a unique
coalitional value on GcsN that satises linearity, the dummy player property, symmetry within
unions, the coalitional p{multinomial total power property, and the property of p{weighted
payos for quotients of unanimity games. It is the coalitional p{multinomial probabilistic
value.
Remark 3.10 Theorem 3.9, where linearity could be replaced with additivity, generalizes
Theorem 1 in [1] and Theorem 3.5 in [10] (i.e., Theorem 3.6 in [11]). We have checked the
logical independence of the axiomatic system for Theorem 3.9 in [14].
7This is revisited in the proof of Theorem 3.9.
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3.3 Discussion
We include here some comments on the properties of coalitional multinomial probabilistic
values considered in the previous subsection.
Remark 3.11 The reader might be surprised because the possibility of having pi 6= pj does
not cause any trouble for symmetry within unions. However, this is not so striking since, as
follows from Eq. (5), if i 2 Bk then pi [v;B] does not depend on pk and hence on either pi or
pj for any other j 2 Bk. This is a special feature of these coalitional values: the payo that
they allocate to a player i 2 Bk depends only on the position of this player in the original
game and the coalition structure, and also on the tendencies of the other unions which, in
turn, depend only on the tendencies of their respective members according to 3.1(i).
Remark 3.12 With our notation Eq. (6) becomes, for the coalitional p{multinomial prob-
abilistic value, X
i2Bk
pi [v;B] = 
p
k [v
B ;Bm] = pk [v
B ];
so the quotient game property is in this case a sort of local eciency (that is, for unions).
Remark 3.13 The coalitional p{multinomial total power property is the natural extension
of a total power property that was rst stated for the Banzhaf value [22] (cf. also [18, 17]) and
gave rise later, among others, to the coalitional q{binomial total power property [10, 3, 11]
and the p{multinomial total power property [12, 13]. It reduces to this latter if B = Bn
but it also extends eciency, to which it reduces if B = BN .
Moreover, as p is a coalitional p{value, that property is a consequence of the quotient
game property|maybe more compelling at rst glance|and can be simply written asX
i2N
pi [v;B] =
X
k2M
pk [v
B ];
thus establishing that the total amount shared according to p in [v;B] coincides with the
amount shared according to p in the quotient game vB.
Remark 3.14 The coalitional p{multinomial probabilistic value fails to satisfy the stan-
dard property of symmetry in the quotient game. This property would state that if k; ` 2M
are symmetric players in vB thenX
i2Bk
pi [v;B] =
X
j2B`
pj [v;B]:
However, it is easy to see (even for n = 2) that this is not true in general. A simple argument
shows that a coalitional multinomial probabilistic value satises symmetry in the quotient
game i it reduces to a symmetric coalitional binomial semivalue, so that symmetry in the
quotient game characterizes the family of symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues within
the class of coalitional multinomial probabilistic values.
It should be clear that the failure is essentially due to the fact that, in general, neither p
nor p satisfy anonymity. But this is precisely the positive reason by which we are consid-
ering here multinomial probabilistic values instead of binomial semivalues: the possibility,
oered by proles p and p, to discriminate among players and unions, respectively.
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Remark 3.15 The property of p{weighted payos for quotients of unanimity games does
not hold for general quotients. The corresponding statement, that could be called \p{
weighted symmetry in the quotient game" would look as follows: if k; ` 2M are symmetric
players in vB then
pk
X
i2Bk
pi [v;B] = p`
X
j2B`
pj [v;B]:
Again it is easy to see (even for n = 2) that this is not true in general. Also it can be easily
shown that the p{coalitional multinomial probabilistic value satises p{weighted symmetry in
the quotient game i it is a symmetric coalitional binomial semivalue, but then the property
becomes just symmetry in the quotient game (and p1 = p2 =    = pn).
4 Simple games
Simple games constitute an especially interesting class of cooperative games. Not only as
a test bed for many cooperative concepts, but also for the variety of their interpretations,
often far from game theory. In particular, they have been intensively applied to describe
and analyze collective decision{making mechanisms and the notion of voting power in the
sense of, e.g., [29] and [5].
A cooperative game v in N is simple i it is monotonic, v(S) 2 f0; 1g for every S  N ,
and v(N) = 1. A coalition S  N is winning in v if v(S) = 1 (otherwise it is called losing),
andW (v) denotes the set of winning coalitions in v. Due to monotonicity, the subsetWm(v)
of all minimal winning coalitions determines W (v) and hence the game. A simple game v is
a weighted majority game i there are nonnegative weights w1; w2; : : : ; wn allocated to the
players and a positive quota q such that
v(S) = 1 i
X
i2S
wi  q:
We then write v  [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn], although this representation is never unique.
Let SGN denote the set of all simple games in a given player set N . It becomes a lattice
under the standard composition laws given in GN by (v _ v0)(S) = maxfv(S); v0(S)g and
(v ^ v0)(S) = minfv(S); v0(S)g. A power index on SGN is a function f : SGN ! RN (we
refer to [6] for a good survey on power indices and to [15] for the use of semivalues as such).
The restriction to SGN of any value on GN is, of course, a power index, which will be denoted
by the same symbol. We will say that a power index f satises the transfer property if
f [v _ v0] + f [v ^ v0] = f [v] + f [v0] for all v; v0 2 SGN :
The multinomial probabilistic values represent a natural extension, to all cooperative
games, of the Banzhaf {indices considered in [7] on the class of simple games. Assessments
 = (1; 2; : : : ; n) used there are the analogue of our tendency proles p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn).
In the case of simple games, each pi can also be attached the meaning of tendency of player i
to support a given proposal when this proposal is submitted to the approval of the collectivity.
Now let SGcsN = SGN  B(N) be the set of all simple games with a coalition structure
in N . A coalitional power index on SGcsN is a function g : SGcsN ! RN . All properties stated
for coalitional values in this paper (except linearity), as well as the natural extension of the
transfer property,
g[v _ v0;B] + g[v ^ v0;B] = g[v;B] + g[v0;B] for all v; v0 2 SGN and B 2 B(N);
make sense for coalitional power indices, and the restriction to SGcsN of any coalitional value
on GcsN is a coalitional power index that will be denoted by the same symbol.
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Our next result states the analogue of Theorem 3.9 when we restrict the coalitional
multinomial probabilistic values to simple games.8
Theorem 4.1 (Axiomatic characterization of each coalitional multinomial probabilistic power
index with positive prole) Let p be a positive prole in a given player set N . Then there is a
unique coalitional power index on SGcsN that satises the transfer property, the dummy player
property, symmetry within unions, the coalitional p{multinomial total power property, and
the property of p{weighted payos for quotients of unanimity games. It is (the restriction
of) the coalitional p{multinomial probabilistic value. Moreover, this coalitional power index
satises positivity and the quotient game property.
5 A computational procedure
In this section we present a method to compute any coalitional multinomial probabilistic
value by means of the multilinear extension of the game. For the sake of completeness, we
recall from [27, 19] that, if f(x1; x2; : : : ; xn) is the multilinear extension of game v in N and
p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn) is a prole in N , then
pi [v] =
@f
@xi
(p1; p2; : : : ; pn) for each i 2 N: (7)
Theorem 5.1 Let p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn) be a prole in N , [v;B] 2 GcsN a game with a coalition
structure in N , and p the prole induced by p in M . Then the following steps lead to the
coalitional p{multinomial probabilistic value of any player i 2 Bk 2 B in [v;B] for any k.
1. Obtain the multilinear extension f(x1; x2; : : : ; xn) of game v.
2. For every r 6= k and all h 2 Br, replace the variable xh with yr. This yields a new
function of xj for j 2 Bk and yr for r 2Mnfkg.
3. In this new function, reduce to 1 all higher exponents, i.e. replace with yr each y
q
r such
that q > 1. This gives a new multilinear function denoted as gk((xj)j2Bk ; (yr)r2Mnfkg).
4. In the function obtained in step 3, substitute each yr by pr. This provides a new
function dened by k((xj)j2Bk) = gk((xj)j2Bk ; (pr)r2Mnfkg).
5. The coalitional p{multinomial probabilistic value of player i 2 Bk in [v;B] is given by
pi [v;B] =
Z 1
0
@k
@xi
(z; z; : : : ; z)dz:
Example 5.2 Let us consider the 5{person weighted majority game v  [68; 46; 42; 23; 15; 9]
and the coalition structure B = ff1g; f2; 3; 5g; f4gg. We will compute p[v] and p[v;B]
for any prole p and the prole p induced by p in M = f1; 2; 3g.
The set of minimal winning coalitions of the game is
Wm(v) = ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f1; 4; 5g; f2; 3; 4g; f2; 3; 5gg
and the multilinear extension of v is
f(x1; x2; x3; x4; x5) = x1x2 + x1x3   x1x2x3 + x1x4x5 + x2x3x4 + x2x3x5 
  x1x2x3x4   x1x2x3x5   x1x2x4x5   x1x3x4x5   x2x3x4x5 + 2x1x2x3x4x5:
8In some manner, for simple games the transfer property replaces linearity. We have also checked the
logical independence of the axiomatic system for Theorem 4.1 in [14].
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The calculation of p[v] derives from Eq. (7):
p1 [v] = p2 + p3   p2p3(1 + p4 + p5   p4p5) + p4p5(1  p2   p3 + p2p3);
p2 [v] = p1 + p3(p4 + p5)  p1p3(1 + p4 + p5   p4p5)  p4p5(p1 + p3   p1p3);
p3 [v] = p1 + p2(p4 + p5)  p1p2(1 + p4 + p5   p4p5)  p4p5(p1 + p2   p1p2);
p4 [v] = p2p3(1  p1   p5 + p1p5) + p1p5(1  p2   p3 + p2p3);
p5 [v] = p2p3(1  p1   p4 + p1p4) + p1p4(1  p2   p3 + p2p3):
For p[v;B] Theorem 5.1 applies. Steps 1{3 give g1(x1; y2; y3) = y2, g3(x4; y1; y2) = y2, and
g2(x2; x3; x5; y1; y3) = (x2 + x3)y1 + x5y1y3 + x2x3( y1 + y3   y1y3)  x2x5y1y3
  x3x5y1y3 + x2x3x5(1  y1   y3 + 2y1y3):
Step 4 leads to 1(x1) = p2, 3(x4) = p2, and
2(x2; x3; x5) = (x2 + x3)p1 + x5p1p3 + x2x3( p1 + p3   p1p3)  x2x5p1p3
  x3x5p1p3 + x2x3x5(1  p1   p3 + 2p1p3):
Step 5 yields p1 [v;B] = 0, 
p
4 [v;B] = 0 and, having in mind that p1 = p1 and p3 = p4,
p2 [v;B] =
Z 1
0
@2
@x2
(z; z; z)dz =
1
3
+
p1 + p4   2p1p4
6
and, similarly,
p3 [v;B] =
1
3
+
p1 + p4   2p1p4
6
and p5 [v;B] =
1
3
  p1 + p4   2p1p4
3
:
6 An application to the political analysis
We consider here the Catalonia Parliament in Legislature 2003{2007, prematurely nished.9
The Catalan political life is rich and fairly complicated. There are two basic ideological
axes to locate parties: the classical left{to{right axis and a crossed axis going from Spanish
centralism to Catalanism (see Fig. 2). Restrictions to the cooperation between parties arise
from ideological anities or incompatibilities, strategic behavior, and even from links with
parties of national level and the inuence of the national politics developed in Madrid.
Five parties elected members to the Catalonia Parliament (135 seats) in the elections
held on November 16, 2003. A brief ideological description of the parties and the seat
distribution are as follows.
1: CiU (Convergencia i Unio), Catalan nationalist middle{of{the{road coalition of two
federated parties, CDC and UDC: 46 seats.
2: PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya), moderate left{wing socialist party, feder-
ated to the Partido Socialista Obrero Espa~nol: 42 seats.
3: ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), radical Catalan nationalist left{wing party:
23 seats.
4: PPC (Partit Popular de Catalunya), conservative party, Catalan delegation of the
Partido Popular: 15 seats.
5: ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya{Verds), coalition of Catalan eurocommunist parties,
federated to Izquierda Unida, and ecologist groups (\Verds"): 9 seats.
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Figure 2: Position of parties in a two-dimensional ideological space
Under the standard absolute majority rule, and assuming voting discipline within parties,
the structure of this parliamentary body can be represented by the weighted majority game
v  [68; 46; 42; 23; 15; 9]:
Therefore, the strategic situation is given by
Wm(v) = ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f1; 4; 5g; f2; 3; 4g; f2; 3; 5gg:
Thus, in the fall of 2003, a main feature of the Catalonia Parliament issued from the
elections was the absence of a party enjoying absolute majority, so a coalition government
was expected to form. We will not try to give here a full description of the complexity of the
Catalan politics, a task more suitable for a political science article. We wish only to state
that the politically most likely coalitions to form, and the corresponding coalition structures
to the analysis of which we will limit ourselves, were clearly the following:
 CiU + ERC, the Catalanist majority alliance: BC = ff1; 3g; f2g; f4g; f5gg.
 PSC + ERC + ICV, the left{wing majority alliance: BL = ff1g; f2; 3; 5g; f4gg, which
was nally formed.
We would like to analyze this situation. Of course, our main interest will center on
the strategic possibilities of party 3 (ERC), whose position is crucial in the two{alternative
scenario we are considering.
A classical approach to study the problem would consist in using either (a) the Shapley
value and the Owen value, (b) the Banzhaf value and the Owen{Banzhaf modied value, or
(c) the Banzhaf value and the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value, in order to evaluate the
strategic possibilities of each party under both hypotheses (Catalanist coalition vs. left{wing
coalition). The results are given in Table 1, where ({) means no coalition formation, (C)
means that CiU + ERC forms, and (LW) means that PSC + ERC + ICV forms.
9Deep disagreements among the parties participating in the coalition government led in 2006 to the dis-
solution of the Catalonia Parliament and early elections. However, our analysis remains valid for Legislature
2006{2010: in spite of the dierent seat distribution given by the elections held on November 1, 2006, the
strategic possibilities were exactly the same.
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(a) (b) (c)
({) (C) (LW) ({) (C) (LW) ({) (C) (LW)
CiU 0:4000 0:5000 0:0000 0:6250 0:5000 0:0000 0:6250 0:6250 0
PSC 0:2333 0:0000 0:3889 0:3750 0:0000 0:3750 0:3750 0 0:4167
ERC 0:2333 0.5000 0:3889 0:3750 0:5000 0:3750 0:3750 0:3750 0.4167
PPC 0:0667 0:0000 0:0000 0:1250 0:0000 0:0000 0:1250 0 0
ICV 0:0667 0:0000 0:2222 0:1250 0:0000 0:1250 0:1250 0 0:1667
Table 1: Classical measures of power in the Catalonia Parliament 2003{2007
According to (a), ERC would strictly prefer joining CiU instead of PSC and ICV. The
same conclusion is obtained according to (b). Instead, according to (c), ERC would strictly
prefer joining PSC and ICV instead of CiU.
Using in case (c) binomial semivalues|and symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues
whenever a coalition structure exists|the conclusion of the analysis is that ERC was not
necessarily forced to participate in the left{wing tripartite government but would have gained
more political power in joining CiU depending on the (common) tendency parameter q of
the parties to form coalitions. More precisely, ERC should have chosen PSC and ICV if,
and only if, q was in the interval ( 5 
p
5
10 ;
5+
p
5
10 ), and hence ERC should have preferred CiU
for 44.72% of possibilities. The details can be found in [11].
Now we will apply multinomial probabilistic values. All allocations needed here have
been computed using the multilinear extension technique, most of them in Example 5.2.
First, it is dicult in principle to say anything of importance about the expressions
for p[v] found in Example 5.2. Fortunately, a simplication can be reasonably achieved.
Indeed, the almost isolated political position of party 4 (PPC) with regard to the remaining
parties strongly suggests taking p4  0, which will make things easier. In particular, this
assumption will reduce the set of politically feasible minimal winning coalitions to
f1; 2g; f1; 3g and f2; 3; 5g:
Then we nd
p1 [v]  p2 + p3   p2p3(1 + p5);
p2 [v]  p1(1  p3) + p3p5(1  p1);
p3 [v]  p1(1  p2) + p2p5(1  p1);
p4 [v] = p2p3(1  p1   p5 + p1p5) + p1p5(1  p2   p3 + p2p3);
p5 [v]  p2p3(1  p1):
These allocations reect the a priori power distribution. (a) The payo to party 1
positively depends on the interest of parties 2 and 3 to form coalitions (e.g. f1; 2g or f1; 3g),
but not completely because it is partially damaged if party 5 is interested in entering a
coalition (f2; 3; 5g). (b) The payo to party 2 is improved by either the interest of party 1
combined with the apathy of parties 3 and 5 (that would favor f1; 2g) or, conversely, by the
interest of these parties combined with the unconcern of party 1, which would give more
chances to f2; 3; 5g instead of f1; 2g and f1; 3g. (c) The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for
party 3. (d) Finally, the possibilities of party 5 clearly rest upon the interest of parties 2
and 3 and the inertia of party 1.
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Summing up, the evaluation of the game in terms of multinomial probabilistic values
reects the a priori tensions existing within each feasible (minimal winning) coalition, in
terms of parameters concerning the will of each party in the coalition formation process.
Tendency proles allow us therefore to overcome the formal structure of the game and try
to understand why a specic coalition forms.
Now we use the coalitional multinomial probabilistic value p. We assume in the sequel
p4  0 and divide the study into two stages.
First stage. We apply p[v;B] in cases B = BC and B = BL for any prole p. Then
 For the Catalanist majority alliance CiU + ERC:
p1 [v;BC ] 
1
2
+
p2(1  p5)
2
and p3 [v;BC ] 
1
2
  p2(1  p5)
2
:
 For the left{wing majority alliance PSC + ERC + ICV:
p2 [v;BL] 
1
3
+
p1
6
; p3 [v;BL] 
1
3
+
p1
6
; and p5 [v;BL] 
1
3
  p1
3
:
It is not true that all players get prot, with respect to the a priori power distribution,
from entering a coalition. There always exist suitable values of the pi's that produce a
damage to a given player when joining.
Incidentally, let us notice that prole p does not appear in these expressions for several
reasons: (a) the payos to the members of a union depend only on the tendencies of the
remaining unions; (b) if a union Br reduces to a singleton fjg then pr = pj ; (c) in both
BC and BL, only one coalition with more than one member forms, so that the payos to its
players can be expressed, according to (b), only in terms of prole p for any induced prole
p; (d) since the coalition that forms is winning, the quotient game is a dictatorship, and
hence the outside players become null and get 0. In both scenarios, the payos sum up to
1 by local eciency.
Second stage. Finally, we will discuss the strategic possibilities of party 3 (ERC). The
power of party 3 in BC and BL is, respectively,
1
2
  p2(1  p5)
2
and
1
3
+
p1
6
:
The coincidence arises when
3p2p5   3p2   p1 + 1 = 0 (8)
and we distinguish two cases.
(a) We have p1 = 1 i p2 = 0 or p5 = 1. In this \degenerate" case, politically unlikely,
the sharing in BC gives 1/2 each to parties 1 and 3, and the sharing in BL gives 1/2 to
parties 2 and 3 and 0 to party 5. These are the best options for ERC in both possibilities.
(b) If p1 < 1 and hence p2 > 0 and p5 < 1, from Eq. (8) it follows that
p5 = 1  1  p1
3p2
:
Let us take p1 2 [0; 1) as a parameter and consider p5 as a function of p2 2 (0; 1] solely.
These functions (ERC indierence curves) are all increasing and concave, tend to  1 when
p2 tends to 0
+ and would tend to 1  if p2 were allowed to tend to +1 (see Fig. 3). When p1
tends to 1, point A = ( 1 p13 ; 0) tends to (0; 0), while point B = (1; 1  1 p13 ) tends to (1; 1),
and the corresponding indierence curve moves towards the left and the top. The limit case,
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Figure 3: Indierence curves for ERC, parameterized by p1
where the curve splits into sides p2 = 0 and p5 = 1 of the square [0; 1]
2, corresponds to the
degenerate case analyzed in (a).
The open region limited by lines p2 = 1, p5 = 0 and any indierence curve represents
the cases where party 3 strictly prefers BL for a given p1. Its area, given by
S =
Z 1
1 p1
3

1  1  p1
3x

dx =
1
3

3  (1  p1) + (1  p1) log 1  p1
3

;
can be taken as a measure of the probability that ERC nally decides joining PSC and ICV
instead of CiU. The minimum of S is 0.3005 and it is attained for p1 = 0. As
dS
dp1
=  1
3
log
1  p1
3
> 0 for all p1 2 [0; 1);
this area increases with p1 and tends to 1 (its maximum) in the degenerate case. Of course,
p1 = 0 gives the best payo to party 3.
Hence there are \many" cases where party 3 should prefer party 1 instead of parties 2
and 5. In other words, party 1 could adapt its tendency (availability to form coalitions) to
those of parties 2 and 5.
The conclusion of this analysis is that joining CiU would have not been a bad decision
for ERC. But also that CiU should have been very careful in expressing its interest to form
coalitions, a point where maybe its leaders were not strategically ecient enough. A scenario
where the main party becomes excluded of the government must be considered exceptional.
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7 Concluding remarks
We have introduced here coalitional multinomial probabilistic values. They apply to games
with a coalition structure by combining the Shapley value and the corresponding multinomial
probabilistic value. We rst apply this latter value to the quotient game and obtain a payo
for each union; next, we apply within each union the Shapley value to a reduced game, played
in the union, for sharing that payo eciently. These values form a n{parametric family
since they depend on proles p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn) that supply information not necessarily
included in the characteristic function of the game. We interpret each component pi as the
tendency of player i to form coalitions.
By using coalitional multinomial probabilistic values one can take into account the inu-
ence of players' dierent personalities in the study of the coalition formation process. The
detailed analysis of the Catalonia Parliament in Section 6 illustrates this idea and also the
good behavior of these values as power indices (i.e., acting on simple games).
In our opinion, by no means these values can qualify as \rare earths".10 In eect: (a) they
lie in the well recognized class of probabilistic values [30]; (b) they generalize the symmetric
coalitional binomial semivalues [10] widely (and, in particular, the symmetric coalitional
Banzhaf value [1]); and (c) they do not admit technical objections, enjoy good properties,
and provide a promising framework for applications. Moreover, the model presented here is
open to modications.
Thus, future work should focus on several aspects concerning the use and interpretation
of the tendency proles and hence of the values. Below is a list of possibilities to act, some
of which agree with suggestions made by the reviewers.
 To drop the independence assumption for the pi's. This will open the possibility of
having proles depending on (i.e., dened in terms of) the game and/or the coalition
structure.
 To search new ways to dene the induced prole in the quotient game, that is, the
pr's. And even making them dependent on B and the quotient game or independent
of the pi's.
 To discuss who denes the tendencies, in both the game and the quotient game, and
whether they can be assumed common knowledge.
 To discover new properties of the values. This task has been already initiated by
members of our research group for multinomial probabilistic values and good results
have been obtained that will be published soon. Some of these properties will probably
extend to the coalitional case.
 To reach new individual axiomatic characterizations for each value.
 To establish an axiomatic characterization of the full family of coalitional multinomial
probabilistic values (so independent of proles p that dene each member). A similar
characterization has been already reached for multinomial probabilistic values [13].
 To extend the coalitional version to all probabilistic values introduced by Weber [30].
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.8. (a) Positivity. If v is monotonic then v(Q[T [fig)  v(Q[T )
for all R and all T , so that pi [v;B]  0 for all i 2 N .
(b) Quotient game property. If k 2M and R Mnfkg we dene vR 2 GBk by
vR(T ) = v(Q [ T )  v(Q) for all T  Bk;
where Q =
[
r2R
Br. For any i 2 Bk the Shapley value gives
'i[vR] =
X
TBknfig
vR(T [ fig)  vR(T )
bk
 
bk 1
t
 = X
TBknfig
v(Q [ T [ fig)  v(Q [ T )
bk
 
bk 1
t
 ;
so that
pi [v;B] =
X
RMnfkg
h Y
j2R
pj
Y
h2MnR
h 6=k
(1  ph)
i
'i[vR]:
As
X
i2Bk
'i[vR] = vR(Bk) = v(Q [Bk)  v(Q) we have
X
i2Bk
pi [v;B] =
X
RMnfkg
h Y
j2R
pj
Y
h2MnR
h 6=k
(1  ph)
i
[v(Q [Bk)  v(Q)]:
Using Eqs. (2) and (3) and the denition of quotient game, we obtainX
i2Bk
pi [v;B] =
X
RMnfkg
pkR[v
B(R [ fkg)  vB(R)] = pk [vB ];
and the statement follows since, according to Remark 3.3(ii),
pk [v
B] = pk [v
B ;Bm]: 
Proof of Theorem 3.9. (Existence) 1. Linearity. It clearly follows from Eq. (5).
2. Dummy player property. Let i be a dummy player in v. Then v(Q[T[fig) v(Q[T ) =
v(fig). Furthermore, X
RMnfkg
Y
j2R
pj
Y
h2MnR
h6=k
(1  ph) =
X
RMnfkg
pkR = 1
by denition of probabilistic value and using thatX
TBknfig
1
bk
 
bk 1
t
 = 1
because 1=bk
 
bk 1
t

is the coecient of the Shapley value for a bk{person game. Therefore
pi [v;B] = v(fig).
3. Symmetry within unions. From Eq. (5) we have
pi [v;B]  pj [v;B] =
X
RMnfkg
h Y
`2R
p`
Y
h2MnR
h6=k
(1  ph)
i
U(R; i; j);
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where
U(R; i; j) =
X
TBknfig
v(Q [ T [ fig)  v(Q [ T )
bk
 
bk 1
t
   X
TBknfjg
v(Q [ T [ fjg)  v(Q [ T )
bk
 
bk 1
t

and Q =
[
r2R
Br. A little algebra yields
U(R; i; j) =
X
TBknfi;jg
1
bk
"
1 
bk 1
t
 + 1 
bk 1
t+1
# [v(Q [ T [ fig)  v(Q [ T [ fjg)]
and each term of this sum vanishes by the symmetry of i and j in v.
4. Coalitional p{multinomial total power property. During the proof of Proposition 3.8
we have established that if k 2M and R Mnfkg thenX
i2Bk
pi [v;B] =
X
RMnfkg
h Y
j2R
pj
Y
h2MnR
h6=k
(1  ph)
i
[v(Q [Bk)  v(Q)]
and the desired property readily follows from this, sinceX
i2N
pi [v;B] =
X
k2M
X
i2Bk
pi [v;B]:
5. Property of p{weighted payos for quotients of unanimity games. Eq. (4) for uT and
p yields
pk [uT ] =
Y
h2T
h6=k
ph for each k 2 T :
Using Proposition 3.8, Remark 3.3(ii) and the fact that (uT )
B = uT ,X
i2Bk
pi [uT ;B] = 
p
k [uT ;B
m] = pk [uT ] =
Y
h2T
h6=k
ph:
Therefore
pk
X
i2Bk
pi [uT ;B] =
Y
h2T
ph = p`
X
j2B`
pj [uT ;B] for all k; ` 2 T
because the intermediate product is symmetrical in k and `.
(Uniqueness) Let g be a coalitional value on GcsN that satises the stated properties. We
will show that g is uniquely determined on all [v;B] 2 GcsN , so that it must coincide with p.
From now on, assume B 2 B(N) is given. Using linearity, we need only to prove
that g is uniquely determined on each unanimity game uT . By the dummy player property,
gi[uT ;B] = 0 if i =2 T . This leaves us with the players of T . By the coalitional p{multinomial
total power property, X
i2N
gi[uT ;B] =
X
i2N
pi [uT ;B]: (9)
Let T = fk 2M : T \Bk 6= ;g and, if k 2 T , let Tk = T \Bk. Then Eq. (9) reduces toX
k2T
X
i2Tk
gi[uT ;B] =
X
i2N
pi [uT ;B]: (10)
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The property of p{weighted payos for quotients of unanimity games implies that
pk
X
i2Tk
gi[uT ;B]  p`
X
j2T`
gj [uT ;B] = 0 for all k; ` 2 T : (11)
Setting, for short, k =
X
i2Tk
gi[uT ;B] for k 2 T and using Eqs. (10) and (11), we obtain a
linear system of t equations and t unknowns k =
X
i2Tk
gi[uT ;B] for k 2 T with determinant
Dt(p1;    ; pt) = ( 1)t 1
X
i2T
p1    p^i    pt 6= 0:
Then, this system has a unique solution for fkgk2T and this means that
X
i2Tk
gi[uT ;B] is
uniquely determined for every k 2 T . Finally, by symmetry within unions
gi[uT ;B] =
1
jTkj
X
j2Tk
gj [uT ;B]
is also uniquely determined for all i 2 Tk.11 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. (Existence) In view of Theorem 3.9, we only need to prove that the
coalitional p{multinomial probabilistic value satises the transfer property, but this easily
follows from linearity (or, simply, from additivity) and the fact that, for all v; v0 2 GN (and,
in particular, for all simple games),
v _ v0 + v ^ v0 = v + v0:
(Uniqueness) Let g be a coalitional power index on SGcsN that satises the stated prop-
erties. We will show that g is uniquely determined on all [v;B] 2 SGcsN , so that it must
coincide with (the restriction of) p.
If v 2 SGN and Wm(v) = fT1; T2; : : : ; Trg then
v = uT1 _ uT2 _    _ uTr :
By recurrence, from the transfer property we obtain, for each B 2 B(N),
g[v;B] =
rX
j=1
( 1)j+1
X
1i1<<ijr
g[uTi1 ^ uTi2 ^    ^ uTij ;B]:
Moreover
uTi1 ^ uTi2 ^    ^ uTij = uTi1[Ti2[[Tij
and therefore we need only to prove that g is uniquely determined on each unanimity game
uT . The remaining of the proof is exactly the same as in the case of Theorem 3.9. 
11The uniqueness proof for g[uT ;B] works in some cases where p is not a positive prole. For example, if
B and T are such that pk > 0 for all k 2 T . And even when pk = 0 for just one k 2 T , because in this case
Dt(p1;    ; pt) = ( 1)t 1p1    p^k    pt 6= 0:
Thus, Theorem 3.9 remains valid if p is not positive but pi = 0 for just one i 2 N . And even when dropping
the positivity condition on p but adding positivity, in the sense of Proposition 3.8, as a requirement for g,
because the conditions lead therefore to k = 0 for those k 2 T such that pk > 0 and
P
h h = 0 for the
remaining h 2 T , i.e. those such that ph = 0. Then the positivity of g implies that each such h vanishes
and the proof can be nished successfully.
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Proof of Theorem 5.1. Steps 1{3 have been already used in [26, 9, 27, 19, 2, 10, 11]. It
will be of interest to recall the common argument here.
By the second and third steps, we obtain a multilinear function where all terms of (1)
corresponding to coalitions S such that S\Br 6= ; and (NnS)\Br 6= ; for some r 2Mnfkg
vanish. Indeed, in step 2, the terms corresponding to these coalitions are of the form
cyq1r (1  yr)q2 , with q1; q2 2 N, and in step 3 they turn on c(yr   yr) thus getting zero.
Hence, the only coalitions S for which the corresponding term of the multilinear extension
in Eq. (1) may not vanish after steps 2 and 3 are those of the form S = Q[T , where T  Bk
and Q =
[
r2R
Br for some R Mnfkg. The function arising from step 3 is therefore
gk((xj)j2Bk ; (yr)r2Mnfkg) =X
RMnfkg
X
TBk
h Y
j2T
xj
Y
h2BknT
(1  xh)
Y
r2R
yr
Y
s2MnR
s6=k
(1  ys)
i
v(Q [ T ):
Replacing each yr with pr (step 4) gives
k((xj)j2Bk) =
X
RMnfkg
X
TBk
h Y
r2R
pr
Y
s2MnR
s6=k
(1  ps)
Y
j2T
xj
Y
h2BknT
(1  xh)
i
v(Q [ T ):
By dierentiating function k((xj)j2Bk) with respect to xi we obtain
@k
@xi
((xj)j2Bk) =X
RMnfkg
h Y
r2R
pr
Y
s2MnR
s6=k
(1 ps)
i X
TBknfig
h Y
j2T
xj
Y
h2BknT
h 6=i
(1 xh)
i
[v(Q[T [fig) v(Q[T )]:
Finally, by step 5, Z 1
0
@k
@xi
(z; z; : : : ; z)dz =
X
RMnfkg
h Y
r2R
pr
Y
s2MnR
s6=k
(1  ps)
i X
TBknfig
[v(Q[T [fig)  v(Q[T )]
Z 1
0
zt(1  z)bk t 1dz =
X
RMnfkg
h Y
r2R
pr
Y
s2MnR
s6=k
(1  ps)
i X
TBknfig
t!(bk   t  1)!
bk!
[v(Q [ T [ fig)  v(Q [ T )];
which is equivalent to Eq. (5) for pi [v;B]. 
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